FIRST DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
THESE SUMMARIES ARE NEITHER APPROVED IN ADVANCE NOR ENDORSED BY THE COURT. THEY ARE NOT HEADNOTES OR SYLLABI. INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD OBTAIN COPIES OF THE ACTUAL DECISIONS FROM THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
DATE: Wednesday, November 19, 2025
CAPTION: BRUNS V. ADLARD
APPEAL NO.: C-240636
TRIAL NO.: A-2201103
KEY WORDS: SUMMARY JUDGMENT — EVIDENCE — CONVERSION — CONSPIRACY — BURDEN ON APPEAL — UNJUST ENRICHMENT — INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
SUMMARY: The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for conversion of money left in ward’s bedroom where the money was capable of identification and the evidence—when viewed in a light most favorable to the guardian—shows that the ward held title or the right to possess the specific money at issue and the money was taken at the direction of defendant and given to her, with only a partial amount being returned.
The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for conversion of ward’s ownership interest in a limited liability company where the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the guardian, does not show that defendant wrongfully exercised dominion or control over ward’s ownership interest in the limited liability company.
The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for conversion of ward’s personal property where the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the guardian, does not show that defendant wrongfully exercised dominion or control over ward’s personal property that may have been removed from the Kentucky property by other prayer group members.
The trial court erred in awarding summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for civil conspiracy deriving from the alleged taking of cash from ward’s bedroom where genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the conversion claim on which the civil-conspiracy claim was based.
Guardian failed to meet his burden on appeal to show error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a not-for-profit corporation on his claim for unjust enrichment where guardian failed to identify any specific money received and/or retained by the not-for-profit corporation.
The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on guardian’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the summary-judgment evidence shows that the ward experienced palpable anxiety and was declared incompetent based on defendant’s alleged extreme acts of psychological influence over ward.
The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant on ward’s daughter’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the summary-judgment evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to daughter, fails to show that any severe emotional distress experienced by daughter was as a result of defendant’s alleged extreme acts of psychological influence over her mother, the ward, rather than as a result of the litigation thereafter.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CAUSE REMANDED
JUDGES: OPINION by ZAYAS, P.J.; CROUSE and NESTOR, JJ., CONCUR.
CAPTION: REISMAN V. SANSKAR, LLC
APPEAL NO.: C-250154
TRIAL NO.: 23CV17323
KEY WORDS: AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE – ATTORNEY FEES – FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER – INDEPENDENT REVIEW – LANDLORD – PERSONAL JURISDICTION – SERVICE OF PROCESS – SMALL CLAIMS COURT – TENANT – WAIVER
SUMMARY: The trial court properly obtained personal jurisdiction over plaintiff on defendant’s amended counterclaim where plaintiff failed to raise the issue of insufficient service of process of defendant’s amended counterclaim by motion or by responsive pleading and where he fully participated in the litigation, effectively waiving the affirmative defense of insufficient service of process.
The trial court properly considered the merits of defendant’s amended counterclaim, even though defendant filed it after 28 days, because the procedural rules in small claims court are somewhat relaxed to accommodate pro se litigants.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to explain its reasoning for adopting the magistrate’s decisions because it was not required to do so in order to perform a proper independent review of objected-to matters.
The trial court’s judgments comported with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, and this court has proper jurisdiction because the time to appeal the final order did not begin to run until the trial court properly ruled on plaintiff’s second set of objections.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by NESTOR, J.; ZAYAS, P.J., and MOORE, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: STATE V. FREEMAN
APPEAL NO.: C-250291
TRIAL NO.: B-2500365
KEY WORDS: R.C. 2941.25 — ALLIED OFFENSES — DOMESTIC VIOLENCE — STRANGULATION — PLAIN ERROR
SUMMARY: The trial court did not plainly err in failing to merge defendant’s convictions for domestic violence and strangulation where the convictions were premised upon separate conduct and import.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by CROUSE, J.; KINSLEY, P.J., and MOORE, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: Evans v. McGuffey
CASE No.: C-250475
KEY WORDS: Writs — habeas corpus — bail denial — R.C. 2937.222 — Constitutional Law/Criminal — Due Process — Napue — Self-defense
SUMMARY: Habeas corpus was the proper remedy for petitioner who alleged that he was denied bail without due process of law, because the trial court refused to reopen petitioner’s bail-denial hearing, such that he lacked an adequate remedy at law.
Petitioner was deprived of his liberty without due process of law when he was denied bail because of the State’s knowing use of false and uncorrected testimony, and that false testimony could have, in any reasonable likelihood, contributed to the trial court’s decision to hold petitioner without bail.
Where a police officer who investigated petitioner on behalf of the State then knowingly made false statements against petitioner in a judicial proceeding, knowledge of those statements’ falsity could be imputed to the State for due-process purposes.
Although evidence of self-defense is not relevant to determining whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that the accused committed the charged offense under R.C. 2937.222(B), it can and should be considered when assessing whether the accused poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the community, and whether any release conditions will reasonably assure the safety of that person and the community under the same provision.
Petitioner demonstrated that he was unlawfully held without bail and entitled to a writ of habeas corpus where (1) petitioner claimed he shot the victim in self-defense, (2) a law-enforcement officer testified at petitioner’s bail-denial hearing that no witnesses had said the victim had a gun or had gone after other individuals on the night of the shooting, (3) petitioner showed that the law-enforcement officer had interviewed witnesses prior to the hearing who told her that the victim had possessed a gun and had gone after other individuals on the night of the shooting, (4) the State had introduced no substantive evidence regarding the shooting at the bail-denial hearing apart from the law-enforcement officer’s testimony, and (5) the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to reopen the bail-denial hearing after he had discovering the evidence of the officer’s false testimony.
JUDGMENT: Writ Granted
JUDGES: OPINION by Crouse, J.; BOCK, J., CONCURS and ZAYAS, P.J., DISSENTS.