FIRST DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
THESE SUMMARIES ARE NEITHER APPROVED IN ADVANCE NOR ENDORSED BY THE COURT. THEY ARE NOT HEADNOTES OR SYLLABI. INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD OBTAIN COPIES OF THE ACTUAL DECISIONS FROM THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
DATE: Wednesday, October 1, 2025
CCAPTION: BUNN V. HLUBEK
APPEAL NO.: C-240680
TRIAL NO.: A-2402543
KEY WORDS: MALPRACTICE — CIV.R. 10(D)(2) — AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT — CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — COMMON-KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION
SUMMARY: The trial court did not err in requiring an affidavit of merit under Civ.R. 10(D)(2) and not allowing plaintiff’s malpractice claim to proceed under the common-knowledge exception where all the malpractice allegations in the complaint are highly technical and concern matters of professional skill and judgment beyond the common knowledge of a jury.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by ZAYAS, P.J.; CROUSE and NESTOR, JJ., CONCUR.
CAPTION: State v. Williamson
APPEAL No.: C-240692
TRIAL No.: B-1403647
KEY WORDS: judgments — community Control — res judicata — appellate review/Criminal — sentencing — R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) — consecutive sentences
SUMMARY: Defendant’s new sentence for violating community control was not invalid because his original sentence, which had imposed community control consecutive to a prison term, had not been void, but merely voidable, and defendant had not challenged it on direct appeal.
The court lacked jurisdiction under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) to review defendant’s sentence imposed following the revocation of community control, where the defendant and prosecutor had jointly recommended a fixed, ten-year prison term for any violation of community control as part of defendant’s original plea, and the sentence imposed for violating community control was entirely consistent with that recommendation and within the range of sentences permitted by law.
JUDGMENT: affirmed
JUDGES: OPINION by Crouse, P.J.; NESTOR and MOORE, JJ., CONCUR.
CAPTION: STATE V. HILL
APPEAL NO.: C-240703
TRIAL NO.: C/21/CRB/22014
KEY WORDS: SIXTH AMENDMENT — SPEEDY TRIAL — MOTION TO DISMISS
SUMMARY: Defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights were violated by the State’s two-and-a-half-year delay between charging defendant with misdemeanor theft and arresting defendant for the theft where the State knew defendant’s address the entire time, made no effort to serve her with the warrant, and failed to rebut the presumption that the lengthy delay prejudiced defendant. [See CONCURRENCE: Where the State negligently allowed enough time to pass between the filing of charges and arresting defendant that the statute of limitations had lapsed, the State cannot rebut the presumption that defendant was prejudiced by the delay.]
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND APPELLANT DISCHARGED
JUDGES: OPINION by BOCK, J.; CROUSE, P.J., and MOORE, J., CONCUR.