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Volume 131, Number 158

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1st District Court of Appeals Summaries

Print May 10, 2024 First District Court of Appeals Summaries
 
 
FIRST DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
        
THESE SUMMARIES ARE NEITHER APPROVED IN ADVANCE NOR ENDORSED BY THE COURT.  THEY ARE NOT HEADNOTES OR SYLLABI.  INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD OBTAIN COPIES OF THE ACTUAL DECISIONS FROM THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
 
DATE: Wednesday, May 8, 2024
CAPTION: QUEEN CITY CLEANING V. I74 WIRED
APPEAL NO: C-230331
TRIAL NO: A-2200140
KEY WORDS: CONTRACTS – DISCOVERY – MOTION TO COMPEL – CIV.R. 56 – ABUSE OF DISCRETION – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – BREACH OF CONTRACT – CONTRACT INTERPRETATION – IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING – IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT – UNJUST ENRICHMENT – FRAUD
SUMMARY: The trial court did not abuse its direction in impliedly denying plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and plaintiff’s motion for a continuance under Civ.R. 56(F) and instead ruling on defendant’s dispositive motion for summary judgment where plaintiff’s substantial rights were not harmed by closing discovery because plaintiff stated in its memorandum in opposition to summary judgment that it had sufficient facts to survive summary judgment.
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on whether defendant breached the contract by providing notice of termination because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant provided to plaintiff the written notice to terminate required by the contract and there are no facts suggesting defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on whether defendant breached the contract by refusing to pay amounts owed prior to providing notice of termination where there is no genuine issue of material fact that the amounts were due for services rendered prior to defendant sending notice to terminate the contract and defendant had not paid those amounts.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on whether defendant breached the contract by not paying amounts owed under the contract during the 30-day notice period where there is no genuine issue of material fact that the termination clause keeps the contract in force for 30 days after a party provides written notice to terminate, and sets the amounts owed while the contract is in force, and the plain language of the satisfaction clause permits defendant to inspect services and make complaints, not withhold payment.
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on plaintiff’s claims for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud where the breach-of-implied-in-fact-contract and unjust-enrichment claims are precluded by the presence of an express contract and the fraud claim merely restates the breach-of-contract claim as a fraudulent breach of contract, which is not a recognized tort claim.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CAUSE REMANDED
JUDGES: OPINION by WINKLER, J.; ZAYAS, P.J., and CROUSE, J., CONCUR.
 
CAPTION: STATE V. ACKLIN
APPEAL NOS: C-230396, C-230397
TRIAL NOS: 21CRB-14288, 21TRC-18577A
KEY WORDS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SUPPRESSION – INVITED ERROR – OPERATING A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE – MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
SUMMARY: Defendant abandoned at the suppression hearing the argument raised on appeal that evidence must be suppressed because the police officers lacked probable cause to arrest defendant and invited any error by the trial court not deciding the motion to suppress on that issue, and therefore, defendant cannot raise the abandoned argument on appeal.
Defendant’s conviction for operating a vehicle while under the influence was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where there are some inconsistencies between the testimony of the police officers and the officers’ body-worn camera footage, but the trier of fact did not clearly lose its way in resolving those discrepancies where the body-worn camera footage supported the officers’ testimonies that defendant displayed physical indicia of intoxication.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by WINKLER, J.; BOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., CONCUR.
 
CAPTION: STATE V. WRIGHT
APPEAL NO: C-230456
TRIAL NO: B-2202732
KEY WORDS: FOURTH AMENDMENT — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION — DRUG DOG — PROBABLE CAUSE — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — WAIVER 
SUMMARY: Defendant’s argument that a drug-detection dog’s sniff constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment because the dog could not differentiate between legal and illegal forms of marijuana was waived where defendant did not make this argument before the trial court. 
The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during a search of defendant’s vehicle where officers had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband based on multiple factors, including a drug-detection dog’s alert. 
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by BOCK, P.J.; BERGERON and WINKLER, JJ., CONCUR.
 
CAPTION: IN RE: J.S.
APPEAL NOS: C-230482, C-230483, C-230484, C-230485, C-230486
TRIAL NOS: 22-3473-01Z, 22-3473-03Z, 22-3473-04Z, 22-3473-05Z, 22-3473-06Z
KEY WORDS: FELONIOUS ASSAULT — EVIDENCE — WEIGHT — SELF-DEFENSE
SUMMARY: The trial court’s finding that the state rebutted the juvenile defendant’s self-defense claim was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the record reflected that defendant shot the unarmed victim after being punched and continued shooting as the victim fled. 
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN C-230482; APPEALS DISMISSED IN C-230483, C-230484, C-230485, and C-230486
JUDGES: OPINION by BOCK, P.J.; BERGERON and WINKLER, JJ., CONCUR.
 
CAPTION: STATE V. GOWDY
APPEAL NO: C-230644
TRIAL NO: B-2304311
KEY WORDS: GUILY PLEA — SELF-DEFENSE — JURY INSTRUCTION —JURY TRIAL 
SUMMARY: The trial court’s premature ruling on self-defense did not coerce defendant into entering a guilty plea where defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently chose to plead guilty to reduced charges rather than risk a trial on greater charges.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by BOCK, P.J.; BERGERON and WINKLER, JJ., CONCUR.
 
 
 
 
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