FIRST DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEALS
THESE SUMMARIES ARE NEITHER APPROVED IN ADVANCE NOR ENDORSED BY THE COURT. THEY ARE NOT HEADNOTES OR SYLLABI. INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD OBTAIN COPIES OF THE ACTUAL DECISIONS FROM THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
DATE: Friday, January 9, 2025
CAPTION: STATE V. GARRETT
APPEAL No.: C-240463
TRIAL No.: B-2302016
KEY WORDS: SECOND AMENDMENT — OHIO CONSTITUTION — FIREARMS — HAVING WEAPONS WHILE UNDER DISABILITY — R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) — MURDER — DISCOVERY SANCTIONS — CRIM.R. 16 — BRADY OBLIGATIONS — HEARSAY — EVID.R. 801(C) — VENUE — JUDICIAL NOTICE — BENCH VIEW — MANIFEST WEIGHT
SUMMARY: The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution did not bar the State from prosecuting defendant for having a weapon while under a disability, where that disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) was based on a prior conviction for aggravated assault involving a firearm.
The trial court did not err in rejecting defendant’s motion to dismiss his weapons-under-disability charges under the Ohio Constitution, because defendant developed no argument as to why the statute was not “a reasonable regulation, promoting the welfare and safety of the people,” as that phrase was used in Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 48 (1993).
Where the State failed to disclose police interview recordings until shortly before the trial was to begin, but where the trial court determined that this nondisclosure was not the result of willful or bad-faith conduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Crim.R. 16 by denying defendant’s motion to compel police to disclose their file to prosecutors, and then to compel prosecutors to review that file and certify that they had provided defendant with all the materials to which defendant was entitled.
Where a police officer testified that, after interviewing an eyewitness, he suspected that defendant had shot the victim, but where the officer did not actually describe the statements that the eyewitness made, the police officer’s testimony did not contain hearsay under Evid.R. 801(C) and State v. Smith, 2022Ohio2592 (1st Dist.), and therefore, that testimony was not barred by Evid.R. 802.
Evidence supporting venue for defendant’s prosecution in Hamilton County was sufficient where witness testimony established that a nearby apartment complex was in Hamilton County, and where the trial judge, sitting without a jury, had visited the site of the murder as part of a bench view and thereafter took “judicial notice that the entire action took place in Hamilton County, Ohio.”
Defendant’s conviction for murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where an eyewitness testified she saw a man she identified as defendant shoot the victim, and where that testimony was circumstantially corroborated by the coroner’s testimony, by surrounding surveillance video, and by the testimony of defendant’s romantic partner who saw defendant fleeing the scene.
Defendant’s conviction for having a weapon while under a disability was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant’s conviction for murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where it was undisputed that the murder was committed with a firearm, and where defendant conceded the existence of his prior conviction for a felony offense of violence giving rise to a disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2).
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
JUDGES: OPINION by Crouse, J.; KINSLEY, P.J., and NESTOR, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: VANDEMARK V. REDER
APPEAL NO.: C-250029
TRIAL NO.: 24CV-20189
KEY WORDS: CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — AGENCY — SIGNATURES — CORPORATIONS — CONTRACTS — FRAUD — THEFT — R.C. 2307.60 — UNJUST ENRICHMENT
SUMMARY: The trial court did not err in dismissing appellants’ breach-of-contract claim against appellees where appellees’ letter of engagement unambiguously manifested an intent to bind only appellees’ corporate principal, where the corporation was not a party defendant, and where the complaint furnished no basis for holding appellees liable for the corporation’s debts.
The trial court erred by dismissing appellants’ claims for fraudulent inducement to contract and civil theft because the complaint alleged that appellees falsely represented to appellants that they intended to perform under the contract, because that false representation reasonably and foreseeably induced appellants to retain appellees’ corporation to appellants’ detriment, and because the legal duties breached in doing so existed independent of and prior to the appellants’ contract with appellees’ corporate principal.
The trial court erred by dismissing appellants’ claim for restitution on a theory of unjust enrichment because, even though the subject matter was covered by an express contract, appellants alleged that appellees were enriched by means of fraud, illegality, or bad faith.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CAUSE REMANDED
JUDGES: OPINION BY CROUSE, J.; ZAYAS, P.J., AND MOORE, J., CONCUR.
CAPTION: STATE V. WALKER
APPEAL NO.: C-250511
TRIAL NO.: 25/CRB/12608
KEY WORDS: SENTENCING — MULTIPLE SENTENCES — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — MISDEMEANOR AND FELONY SENTENCES
SUMMARY: The trial court abused its discretion in ordering a 180-day jail term imposed on defendant in the instant misdemeanor case to run consecutively to a 30-month prison term imposed against defendant in a related felony case because the consecutive nature of the misdemeanor sentence was not authorized under R.C. 2929.41(B).
JUDGMENT: SENTENCE REVERSED IN PART AND CAUSE REMANDED
JUDGES: OPINION BY BOCK, J.; ZAYAS, P.J., and NESTOR, J., CONCUR.